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DISCOURSE DEIXIS: REFERENCE TO DISCOURSE SEGMENTS 
ABSTRACT 
Bonnie Lynn Webber 
Department of Computer & Information Science 
University of Pennsylvania 
Philadelphia PA 19104-6389 
Computational approaches to discourse understanding 
have a two-part goal: (1) to identify those aspects of 
discourse understanding that require process-based 
accounts, and (2) to characterize the processes and data 
structures they involve. To date, in the area of 
reference, process-based accounts have been developed 
for subsequent reference via anaphoric pronouns and 
reference via definite descriptors. In this paper, I 
propose and argue for a process-based account of 
subsequent reference via deictic expressions. A 
significant feature of this account is that it attributes 
distinct mental reality to units of text often called 
discourse segments, a reality that is distinct from 
that of the entities described therein. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There seem to be at least two constructs that most 
current theories of discourse understanding have 
adopted in at least some form. The first is the 
discourse entity, first introduced by Lauri 
Kartumen in 1976 (under the name "discourse 
referent") [9] and employed (under various other 
names) by many researchers, including myself [18]. 
The other is the discourse segment. 
Discourse entities provide these theories with a 
uniform way of explaining what it is that noun 
phrases (NP) and pronouns in a discourse refer to. 
Some NPs evoke a new discourse entity in the 
listener's evolving model of the discourse (which I 
have called simply a discourse model), others refer 
to ones that are already there. Such entities may 
correspond to something in the outside world, but 
they do not have to. To avoid confusion with a sense 
of "referring in the outside world, I will use the 
terms refer, here, meaning "refer in a model", and 
referent,, for the entity in the model picked out 
by the linguistic expression. 
The basic features of a discourse entity are that (a) it 
is a constant within the current disco&se model .&d 
that (b) one can attribute to it, inter alia, properties 
and relationships with other entities. (It is for this 
reason that Bill Woods once called them "conceptual 
coat hooks".) In some theories, different parts of the 
discourse model (often called spaces) may represent 
different modalities, including hypothetical contexts, 
quantified contexts, the belief contexts of different 
agents, etc. Depending on what space is currently 
being described, the same NP or pronoun may evoke 
and/or refer, to very different discourse entities. 
The other common construct is the discourse 
segment. While discourse segmentation is generally 
taken to be a chunking of a linguistic text into 
sequences of related clauses or sentences, James Allen 
notes: 
... there is little consensus on what the segments of 
a particular discourse should be or how 
segmentation could be accomplished. One reason 
for this lack of consensus is that there is no precise 
definition of what a segment is beyond the 
intuition that certain sentences naturally group 
together [[I], p. 398-91 
What is taken to unify a segment is different in 
different theories: for example, among computational 
linguists, Grosz & Sidner [5]  take a discourse 
segment to be a chunk of text that expresses a 
common purpose (what they have called a discourse 
segment purpose) with respect to the speaker's 
plans; Hobbs 181 takes a discourse segment to be a 
chunk of text that has a common meaning; while 
Nakhimovsky [12], considering only narrative, takes 
a discourse segment to be a chunk of text that 
describes a single event from a single perspective. 
S j +  1 
Figure 1. Discourse Segm 
While discourse segment is usually defined 
recursively, theories differ in what they take the 
minimal segment to be. Hobbs takes it to be a 
sentence, and Polanyi [12], a clause. Grosz & 
Sidner do not state explicitly how much is needed to 
express a single purpose, but from their examples, it 
appears to be a single sentence as well. (Unlike 
Hobbs and Polanyi, Grosz & Sidner do not consider 
every sentence to be a discourse segment per se.) 
Since discourse segment is defined recursively, the 
resulting segmentation of a text (or at least, large 
parts of it) can be described as a tree. From the point 
of view of processing, this means that at any point in 
the discourse, several segments, each embedded in the 
one higher, may still be open - i.e., under 
construction. This is illustrated schematically in 
Figure 1. 
At the point of processing sentence Sj+l in this 
example, segments DSkl, D S u l i ,  ..., DSulj  are 
complete (closed - indicated by a *), while DSk, 
DSu,  and DSu1 are open, able to incorporate 
sentence Sj+l (or, alternatively, its corresponding 
unary discourse segment). Of special interest is the 
right frontier of the tree -- the set of nodes 
comprising the most recent closed segment and all 
currently open segments -- here {DSulj, DSul ,  
DSu ,  and DSk), which I will make use of later in 
Section 3. Several researchers (including Grosz & 
Sidner 151, Hirschberg & Litman [6], Robin Cohen 
entat ion 
[2] and Rachel Reichman [ 151) have discussed 
problems inherent in this discourse parsing task, 
among which is the lack of precise definition of its 
basic building block. 
For the current discussion, the most significant thing 
about these two constructs is their different 
associations: discourse entities go with NPs (to 
explain anaphoric and definite referenca and 
discourse segments go with sentences or clauses 
(to explain textual coherence and discourse structure). 
This leaves a gap in the case of reference, to what 
can only be taken to be some aspect of a sequence of 
clauses, sentences or utterances (e.g., its content, 
form, modality, etc.), for example: 
Example 1 
It's always been presumed that when the 
glaciers receded, the area got very hot. The 
Folsum men couldn't adapt, and they died out. 
That's what is supposed to have happened. It's 
the textbook dogma. But it's wrong. They were 
human and smart. They adapted their weapons 
and culture, and they survived. 
Example 2 
The tools come from the development of new 
types of computing devices. Just as we 
thought of intelligence in terms of 
servomechanism in the 1950s, and in terms of 
sequential computers in the sixties and 
seventies, we are now beginning to think in 
terms of parallel computers, in which tens of 
thousands of processors work together. This 
is not a deep, philosophical shift, but it is of 
great practical importance, since it is now 
possible to study large emergent systems 
experimentally. [[6] p. 1761 
The obvious question is whether such referencem 
involves the same processes used to explain how a 
pronoun or NP evokes and/or refers, to a discourse 
entity or whether some other sort of process is 
involved. In this paper I will argue for the latter, 
giving evidence for a separate reference, process by 
which a linguistic expression is first interpreted as a 
pointer to the representation of a discourse 
segment and then further constrained to specify 
either (a) a particular aspect of the discourse segment 
(e.g., its form, interpretation, speech act, etc.) or (b) a 
particular entity within its interpretation. 
In Section 2, I will attempt to justify the existence 
of a second referring, process linked to a 
representation of discourse segments per se. In 
Section 3, I will attempt to justify particular features 
of the proposed process, and Section 4 summarizes 
the implications of this work for discourse 
understanding. 
2. Justifying a Second Referringm Process 
There is ample evidence that subsequent reference can 
be made to some aspect of a sequence of clauses in 
text. Besides Examples 1 and 2 above, several other 
examples will be presented later, and the reader should 
have no trouble finding more. So the existence of 
such a phenomenon is not in dispute. Also not in 
dispute is the fact that such subsequent reference is 
most often done via deictic pronouns: Of 79 instances 
of prominal referencem to clausal material found in 
five written texts , only 14 (-18%) used the pronoun 
it while the other 65 (-82%) used either this or that 
(17 instances of that and 48 of this). On the other 
hand, looking at all instances of pronominal 
referencem using it to discourse entities evoked by 
NPS*, of 41 such references, 39 (-95%) used it while 
only 2 (-5%) used this or that. Because of this, I 
will call this type of reference discourse deixis. 
The fist thing to note about discourse deixis is that 
the referentm is often distinct from the things 
described in the sequence. For example, 
Example 3 
There's two houses you might be interested in: 
House A is in Palo Alto. It's got 3 bedrooms and 
2 baths, and was built in 1950. It's on a quarter 
acre, with a lovely garden, and the owner is asking 
$425K. But that's all I know about it. 
House B is in Portola Vally. It's got 3 bedrooms, 
4 baths and a kidney-shaped pool, and was also 
built in 1950. It's on 4 acres of steep wooded 
slope, with a view of the mountains. The owner is 
asking $600K. I heard all this from a friend, who 
saw the house yesterday. 
Is that enough information for you to decide 
which to look at? 
In this passage, that in the second paragraph does not 
refer to House A (although all instances of it do): 
rather it refers to the description of House A presented 
there. Similarly (all) this in the third paragraph does 
not refer to House B (although again, all instances of 
it do): rather it refers to the description of House B 
presented there. That in the fourth paragraph refers to 
the descriptions of the two houses taken together. 
That in each case it is the given description(s) that 
this and that are accessing and not the houses, can 
be seen by interleaving the two descriptions, a 
technique often used when comparing two items: 
Example 4 
There's two houses you might be interested in: 
House A is in Palo Alto, House B in Portola 
Vally. Both were built in 1950, and both have 3 
bedrooms. House A has 2 baths, and B, 4. House 
B also has a kidney-shaped pool. House A is on 
a quarter acre, with a lovely garden, while House B 
is on 4 acres of steep wooded slope, with a view 
of the mountains.The owner of House A is asking 
$425K. The owner of House B is asking $600K. 
#That's all I know about House A. #This I heard 
from a fiiend, who saw House B before it came on 
the market. 
Is that enough information for you to decide 
which to look at? 
Here houses A and B are described together, and the 
failure of that and this to refer successfully in the 
second paragraph indicates that (a) it is not the houses 
being referredm to and (b) the individual descriptions 
available for referencem in Example 3 are no longer 
available here. One must conclude from this that it is 
something associated with the sequences themselves 
rather than the discourse entities described therein that 
this and that referm to here. 
The next thing to note is that the only sequences of 
utterances that appear to allow such pronominal 
reference, are ones that intuitively constitute a 
discourse segment (cf. Section l), as in Example 
1 (repeated here) and Example 5: 
Example 1 
It's always been presumed that [lwhen the glaciers 
receded, the area got very hot. The Folsum men 
couldn't adapt, and they died out.11 That's what 
is supposed to have happened. It's the textbook 
dogma. But it's wrong. They were human and 
smart. They adapted their weapons and culture, and 
they survived. 
Example 5 
... it should be possible to identify certain 
functions as being unnecessary for thought by 
studying patients whose cognitive abilities are 
unaffected by locally confined damage to the brain. 
For example, [lbinocular stereo fusion is known 
to take place in a specific area of the cortex near 
the back of the head. [2Patients with damage to 
this area of the cortex have visual handicaps but 
show no obvious impairment in their ability to 
think2] This suggests that stereo fusion is not 
necessary for thought.11 This is a simple 
example, and the conclusion is not surprising .... 
[[61, P. 1851 
In Example 1, that can be taken to refer, to the 
narrative of the glaciers and the Folsurn men, which 
is intuitively a coherent discourse segment. (Brackets 
have been added to indicate discourse segments. 
Subscripts allow for embedded segments.) In Example 
5, the first this can be taken as referring to the 
observation about visual cortex-damaged patients. The 
second this can be taken as referring to the whole 
embedded "brain damage" example. 
To summarize the current claim: in the process of 
discourse understanding, a referentm must be 
associated with each discourse segment, independent 
of the things it describes. Moreover, as Example 6 
shows, this referentm must have at least three 
properties associated with it: the speech act import of 
the segment, the form of the segment, and its 
interpretation (e.g., as a situation, event, object 
description, etc.) 
Example 6 
A: Hey, they've promoted Fred to second vice 
president. 
(* that speech act *) 
B 1: That's a lie. 
(* that expression *) 
B2:: That's a funny way to describe the situation. 
(* that event *) 
B3: When did that happen? 
(* that action *) 
Bq: That's a weird thing for them to do. 
I have not said anything about whether or not these 
discourse segment referentsm should be considered 
discourse entities like their NP-evoked counterparts. 
This is because I do not believe there is enough 
evidence to warrant taking a stand. Part of the 
problem is that there is no precise criterion for 
"discourse entity-hood? However, if every discourse 
segment evokes a discourse entity, an account will be 
needed of (1) when in the course of processing a 
segment such a thing happens, and (2) what the 
'focus' status of each of these entities is. 
3. Features of Deictic Referencem 
I suggest that the process of resolving discourse 
segment reference, involves the following steps: 
1. An input pronoun is first interpreted as a pointer 
to a representation of a discourse segment on the 
right frontier (cf. Section 1). 
2. As the rest of the clause containing the pronoun 
is interpreted, pronoun interpretation may be 
either 
a. further constrained to some property of the 
discourse segment representation 
b. extended to one of the discourse entities within 
the interpretation of the segment 
3. As a consequence of whether this or that was 
used, the listener characterizes the speaker's 
"psychological distance" to its referentm as either 
"close" or "far away". That is, this well-known 
deictic feature of thisjthat is not used in the 
referent-fmding process but rather afterwards, in 
attributing the speaker's relationship to that 
referent,. 
In this section, I will try to motivate each of the 
proposed steps. 
I have already argued that some deictic pronouns must 
be interpreted with respect to a discourse segment. 
Here I claim that the only discourse segments so 
available are ones on the right frontier. My evidence 
for this consists of (a) it being true of the 69 
clausally-referring instances of this and that found 
in the five texts and (b) the oddity of examples like 
the following variation of Example 3 where that in 
paragraph 3 is intended to referm to the description of 
House A. 
Example 3' 
There's two houses you might be interested in: 
House A is in Palo Alto. It's got 3 bedrooms and 
2 baths, and was built in 1950. It's on a quarter 
acre, with a lovely garden, and the owner is asking 
$425K. 
House B is in Portola Vally. It's got 3 bedrooms, 
4 baths and a kidney-shaped pool, and was also 
built in 1950. It's on 4 acres of steep wooded 
slope, with a view of the mountains. The owner is 
asking $600K. I heard all this from a friend, who 
saw the house yesterday. #But that's all I know 
about House A? 
Is that enough information for you to decide 
which to look at? 
(Note that this very limited availability of possible 
referents, and the ability to coerce referents to any of 
their parts which I shall argue for shortly suggests 
parallels between this phenomenon and definite NP 
and temporal anaphora.) 
Because at any time, there may be more than one 
discourse segment on the right frontier, part of the 
reference resolution process involves identifying 
which one is intended. To see this, re-consider the 
first part of Example 5. 
Example 5 
... it should be possible to identify certain 
functions as being unnecessary for thought by 
studying patients whose cognitive abilities are 
unaffected by locally confined damage to the brain. 
For example, binocular stereo fusion is known to 
take place in a specific area of the cortex near the 
back of the head. Patients with damage to this area 
of the cortex have visual handicaps but show no 
obvious impairment in their ability to think. 
This .... 
At this point in the discourse, there are several 
things that this can be taken as specifying. 
Considering just the things associated with clauses 
(and just this segment of text, and not what it is 
embedded in), this can be taken as specifying either 
the segment associated with the previous sentence (as 
in the original text - "This suggests that stereo 
fusion is not necessary for thought.") or the segment 
associated with the description of the whole example - 
"This is only a simple example, and the conclusion 
is not surprising..."). The listener's choice depends on 
what is compatible with the meaning of the rest of 
the senten~e.~ As with other types of ambiguity, 
there may be a default (i.e. context-independent) 
preference for one particular form of construal over 
the others (cf. [3]) but it is easily over-ridden by 
context. 
This ambiguity as to the intended designatum of a 
pointer is very similar to the ambiguity associated 
with the more fundamental and historically prior use 
of deixis in pointing within a shared spatio-temporal 
context, as in the following example: 
Example 7 
[A and A-Junior are standing in A's art gallery] 
A: Someday this will all be yours. 
Here this could be interpreted as either the business, 
the pictures, or the physical gallery.6 Both Quine 
1141 and Miller [lo] have observed in this regard that 
all pointing is ambiguous: the intended 
demonstratum of a pointing gesture can be any of 
the infinite number of points "intersected" by the 
gesture or any of the structures encompassing those 
points. (Or, one might add, any interpretation of 
those structures.) The ambiguity here as to how large 
a segment on the right frontier is encompassed by a 
this or that is very similar. 
(Another feature that Quine and Miller mention, that 
will come up later in this discussion, involves 
constraints on the demonstratum of a pointing 
gesture to being something present in the shared 
context or some mulually recognizable re- 
interpretation of it. The latter is what Quine has 
called deferred ostension. It enables one, given 
the right audience, to point to the ceiling, with wires 
dangling from the center, say "That's off being 
cleaned" and effectively refer to the chandelier. Most 
examples of deferred ostension, both in spatio- 
temporal deixis and discourse deixis, are not that 
extreme. However, as I will try to show, both these 
features -- ambiguity and "required presence" -- are 
characteristic of discourse deixis as well.) 
Having taken the initial step of interpreting a 
pronoun as pointing to the representation of a 
discourse segment, the proposed process must then be 
able to further coerce [8,11] that interpretation to be 
some property of the discourse segment 
representation or to some entity within it. Example 
6 (above) illustrates the first type of coercion, 
Example 8, the latter. 
Example 8 
A: In the Antarctic autumn, Emperor penguins 
migrate to Tasmania. 
B1: That's where they wait out the long Antarctic 
winter. 
(* that place *) 
B2: So that's what you're likely to see there in 
May. 
(* that species of birds *) 
B3: That's when it begins to get too cold even for 
a penguin. 
(* that time *) 
The reason for taking discourse segment identification 
and coercion as two separate steps in the process is to 
accommodate the fact that most instances of this and 
that are as the first NP in a ~ l a u s e . ~  Since the 
listener cannot say for sure what they referm to until 
more evidence comes in from the rest of the sentence, 
a two-stage process allows the first stage of the 
process to be done immediately, with the second stage 
done as a subsequent constraint satisfaction process. 
This would resemble spatio-temporal uses of this 
and that, where the listener recognizes the general 
pointing gesture, and then tries to figure out the 
intended demonstratum based on what the speaker 
says about it (and on general heuristics about what 
might be worth pointing to). 
Notice that this step of further constraining a 
pointing gesture also allows for a uniform treatment 
of this and do this (that and do that). A preposed 
thislthat may be the object of do or of some other 
verb, but the listener will not know which, until s/he 
reaches the verb itself, as in Example 9. Considering 
actions as properties of their respective events, the 
listener should be able to coerce that to be some 
appropriate facet of the discourse segment (or to some 
entity within that segment - as I will discuss next) 
that can be said or done.8 
Example 9 
Gladys told Sam last night that Fred was a 
complete jerk. 
On the other hand, what appears to be an additional 
ambiguity in resolving thisithat may not be one at 
all. That is, a listener who is asked what a given 
thisithat refersm to must describe the representation 
that s/he has created. This act of description is subject 
to alot of variability. For example, given a segment 
in which a statement A is supported by several pieces 
of evidence (B,C,D), the listener might just describe 
A (the top level of the representation) or slhe might 
verbalize the whole representation. 
As with anaphoric pronouns, when a deictic pronoun 
specifies an NPevoked discourse entity, it must 
actually be part of its corresponding discourse 
segment interpretation. The interesting thing is that 
the same holds for deictic NPs, distinguishing them 
from anaphoric definite NPs, which can easily referm 
to things associated in some way with an exisiting 
entity, as in 
Example 10 
John and Mary decided to go on a picnic. 
While they remembered most things, 
they forgot to put the picnic supplies in the 
cooler. 
So when they got to the park, the beer was 
warm. 
By contrast, a similar example with a demonstrative 
NP sounds definitely odd -- 
Example 11 
John and Mary decided to go on a picnic. 
While they remembered most things, 
they forgot to put the picnic supplies in the 
cooler. 
#So when they got to the park, that beer was 
warm. 
Another example illustrates this in another way: 
given that both anaphoric reference and deictic 
reference are possible in a particular context, an 
anaphoric NP and a deictic NP will be interpreted 
differently, even if in all other ways the NPs are the 
same. The anaphoric NP may refer, to something 
asociated with the current focus, while the deictic NP 
must point to something already explicitly included 
there. For example, 
a. Anyway, that 's what Fred believes that 
Gladys said. 




a. Some files are superfiles. 
b. To screw up some one's directory, look at the 
files. 
c. If one of them is a superfile, .... 
Example 13 
a. Some files are superfiles. 
b. To screw up some one's directory, look at 
those files. 
c. They will tell you which of his files is 
absolutely vital to him. 
In Example 12, the files is anaphoric, specifying 
the files in that person's directory, the entity currently 
in focus. In Example 13, those files is deictic, 
pointing to the files that are superfiles, i.e., to a 
discourse entity explicitly in the interpretation of the 
just current discourse segment. 
Now, nothing in the process so far described 
distinguishes this and that. This is because with 
respect to discourse segment referencem, it is rarely 
the case that the two cannot be used 
interchangeably.10 Thus it must be the case that this 
"psychological distance" feature of the deictic only 
comes into play after the referent, is found. This 
does not imply though that this and that cannot 
have different effects on the discourse: in Sidner's 
1982 theory [17] and in Schuster's theory of reference 
to actions and events [16], this and that are also 
distinguished by their effect (or lack thereof) on the 
discourse focus. This is compatible with it being 
a side effect of judging the speaker's "distance" from 
the referent,, that the listener's beliefs about their 
shared discourse focus are revised. 
To summarize, in Section 2, I argued for the 
existence of a second referring process associated with 
discourse segments per se rather than what they 
describe. In this section, I have argued for it having 
the features of pointing to the representation of a 
discourse segment on the right frontier, followed by 
further refinement to a property of the segment or an 
entity within its interpretation. 
Here I want to argue for the proposed process having 
one additional feature. I have separated it out because 
it is not essential to the above arguments. However, 
it does permit an account of the common pattern of 
reference illustrated in Examples 1,2,14 and 15. 
It's always been presumed that when the 
glaciers receded, the area got very hot. The 
Folsum men couldn't adapt, and they died out. 
That's what is supposed to have happened. 
It's the textbook dogma. But it's wrong. 
They were human and smart. They adapted 
their weapons and culture, and they survived. 
Example 2 
The tools come from the development of new 
types of computing devices. Just as we 
thought of intelligence in terms of 
servomechanism in the 1950s, and in terms 
of sequential computers in the sixties and 
seventies, we are now beginning to think in 
terms of parallel computers, in which tens of 
thousands of processors work together. This 
is not a deep, philosophical shift, but it is of 
great practical importance, since it is now 
possible to study large emergent systems 
experimentally. [[6], p. 1761 
Example 14 
I don't think this can be taken seriously either. 
It would mean in effect that we had learned 
nothing at all from the evaluation, and anyway 
we can't afford the resources it would entail. 
Example 15 
The Texas attorney general said that the 
McDonald's announcement represented "a 
calculated effort to make the public think that 
they were doing this out of the goodness of their 
heart when, in fact, they were doing it because of 
pressure from our office. miladelphia Inquirer, 
13 June 19861 
Suppose one assumes that the ability to specify 
something via an anaphoric pronoun is a sufficient 
criterion for "discourse entity-hood. Then I would 
claim that whether or not a discourse segment 
referent, is initially created as a discourse entity, 
once the speaker has successfully referred to it via 
thisfthat, it must now have the status of a discourse 
entity since it can be referenced via the anaphoric 
pronoun it. l 
Note that I do not mean to imply that one cannot 
refer deictically to the same thing more than once -- 
one clearly can, for example 
Example 16 Schuster for their helpful comments on many, many 
earlier versions of this paper. 
They wouldn't hear to my giving up my career in 
New York. That was where I belonged. That 
was where I had to be to do my work. Peter 
Taylor, A Summons to Memphis, p.681 
Example 17 
By this time of course I accepted Holly's doctrine 
that our old people must be not merely forgiven 
all their injustices and unconscious cruelties in 
their roles as parents but that any selfishness on 
their parts had actually been required of them if 
they were to remain whole human beings and not 
become merely guardian robots of the young. 
This was something to be remembered, not 
forgotten. This was something to be accepted 
and even welcomed, not forgotten or forgiven. 
But of the (admittedly few) "naturally occurring" 
instances of this phenomenon that I have so far 
found, the matrix clauses are strongly parallel -- 
comments on the same thing. Moreover, except in 
cases such as Example 17, where the second clause 
intensifies the predication expressed in the first, the 
two clauses could have been presented in either order, 
which does not appear to be the case in the deixis- 
anaphor pattern of reference. 
4. SUMMARY 
In this paper, I have proposed and argued for a 
process-based account of subsequent reference via 
deictic expressions. The account depends on 
discourse segments having their own mental 
reality, distinct from that of the entities described 
therein. As such, discourse segments play a direct role 
in this theory, as opposed to their indirect role in 
explaining, for example, how the referents of definite 
NPs are constrained. One consequence is it becomes 
as important to consider the representation of entire 
discourse segments and their features as it is to 
consider the representation of individual NPs and 
clauses. 
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All instances of pronominal referencem using it, 
this and that were tabulated. 
I specifically used written (primarily objective) 
expositions rather than spoken texts in order to avoid 
the common use of thisithat in first-person 
accounts to refer to the outside world. 
that is, ignoring all syncategorematic uses of it (as 
in "It is possible that John is here") 
As I shall argue at the end of Section 3, the ability 
to refer to something anaphorically might be a 
sufficient, though perhaps not a necessary criterion 
for "entity-hood". 
If the example were "That's all I know about it", 
that would be taken as referring to the description of 
House B, not the discourse segment associated with 
the clause "I heard all this from a friend, who saw the 
house yesterday". (Call this later segment DS-h.) 
However, this need not invalidate my claim about the 
accessibility of discourse segments since DS-h can be 
understood as a parenthetical, which are treated 
differently than non-parentheticals in theories of 
discourse - cf. [GS85]. While a parenthetical may 
itself contain a decitic pointer to a discourse segment 
on the right frontier, it doesn't influence the frontier. 
Thus that still has the same discourse segments 
accessible as it would without the parenthetical. 
Another example of discourse deixis from a 
parenthetical is this variation of Example 5. 
... it should be possible to identify certain 
functions as being unnecessary for thought by 
studying patients whose cognitive abilities are 
unaffected by locally confined damage to the brain. 
For example, binocular stereo fusion is known to 
take place in a specific area of the cortex near the 
back of the head. (This was discovered about 10 
years ago). Patients with damage to this area of 
the cortex have visual handicaps but show no 
obvious impairment in their ability to think. 
To get further data on this, I ran an informal 
"discourse completion" experiment, modelled on the 
above lines, presenting a short, multi-sentence text 
which I judged as having several segments on the 
right frontier at the point of the last sentence. As 
above, I asked subjects to complete a next sentence 
beginning "That ..." 
<The subject here is legends of the formation of the 
Grand Canyon> 
<What follows is the second paragraph of the given 
text> 
"Another legend tells of a great chief who could not 
cease from mourning the death of his beloved wife. 
Finally the gods offered to take him to visit his wife 
so that he could see she was contented in the happy 
hunting ground. In exchange, he was to stop grieving 
when he returned to the land of the living. That ..." 
I also asked subjects to paraphrase what they wrote, 
to see explicitly what they took that to specify. The 
responses I got showed them taking it to specify 
either the chiefs action (expressed in the previous, 
single sentence segment) or the whole "bargain" 
(expressed in the segment comprising both previous 
clauses). While this particular experiment was only 
informal and suggestive, well-controlled versions 
should be able to produce harder results. 
Presumably A-Junior will have enough context to 
resolve this more precisely, or he will be smart 
enough to ask. 
Of the 69 clausally-refemng instances of this and 
that pronouns, 51 (-70%) were in subject position 
in standard SVO clauses (7 instances of that and 44, 
of this), 17 played some other role within their 
matrix clause, and 1 was a preposed adverbial ("after 
that"). Hence -75% were first NPs. 
This does not say which of those actions will be 
picked out. See [Schus88] for a discussion of the 
choice of evendaction referents of pronouns. 
It is possible to construct quite acceptable examples 
in which a preposed that functions as the object of 
both do and some other verb -- for example "Several 
universities have made computer science a separate 
school. But that is not necessarily what we want or 
could even do." The conjunction of two forms usually 
means that at some level, both forms are taken as 
being the same. 
lo That is because with respect to discourse segment 
referencem, it is rarely the case that the two cannot be 
used interchangeably! 
l1 If one assumes that a discourse segment referentm 
is also a discourse entity ab ovo, as it were, then this 
pattern might simply be interpreted as such an entity 
coming into focus as a result of the deictic reference. 
As I noted earlier, there is not enough evidence to 
argue either way yet, nor is it clear that the two 
accounts would have vastly different consequences 
anyway. 
